<¶>C. (F), may include a loan requiring repayment in a single installment. Lenders registered under the MLA may make single-installment, interest-bearing loans, and the STLA does not limit the authority of lenders registered under the MLA to make any loans authorized by the MLA. The unambiguous language of the MLA, consistent with the reasonable administrative construction of R.C. (F), compels the conclusion that appellant’s loan to appellee was an interest-bearing loan as defined under the MLA.
<¶>As a final matter, we note that we do not decide whether the loan described in the customer agreement complies in all respects with the MLA, but only whether appellant, as an MLA registrant, was entitled to make MLA-compliant loans unaffected by the STLA. For example, we do not decide whether the customer agreement’s requirement of interest at 25 percent per annum, pursuant to R.C. , was permitted by the MLA, or whether the 21–percent–interest cap in R.C. (A) applies. The court of appeals did not address that issue, and appellant’s propositions of law do not implicate it here.
<¶>For all these reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Ninth District Court of Appeals and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
<¶> R.C. (A) provides that notwithstanding any other provisions of the Revised Code, an MLA lender may charge interest not exceeding 21 percent per year on the unpaid principal balance, but R.C. authorizes an interest rate not exceeding 25 percent per year “[a]s an alternative” to the rate permitted by R.C. (A).
<¶>Appellant was previously a licensed lender under the Check–Cashing Lender Law. Appellant registered as a lender under the MLA in , after the passage of H.B. 545. Appellant is not registered under the STLA. Appellant admits that the loan product it offers now, purportedly under the MLA, is similar to the loan product it previously offered under the Check–Cashing Lender Law, but it contends that the fees it is able to collect on the MLA product are less than those it collected under the Check–Cashing Lender Law.
<¶>This court accepted appellant’s cashusaadvance.net/payday-loans-al discretionary appeal. 136 Ohio St.3d 1505, 2013–Ohio–4653, 995 N.E.2d 1209. Although appellee has not appeared before this court, numerous amici have ably presented argument in support of the lower courts’ judgments.
<¶>Appellant’s loan to appellee satisfies the definition of an interest-bearing loan under R.C. (F). The customer agreement stated as follows:
The brand new MLA does not restriction the total amount that can be borrowed or even the lifetime of the borrowed funds
<¶> R.C. (A) and (A). But the loan here was not an STLA loan; it is undisputed that the STLA would not permit the subject loan, because its terms contravene the STLA’s requirements regarding the loan term, interest, and fees. Because appellant did not issue a “loan made pursuant to sections to of the Revised Code,” the loan does not qualify as a “short-term loan” subject to the requirements of the STLA.
Appellant is not licensed within the STLA that will be, therefore, perhaps not eligible to create quick-identity money pursuant toward STLA
<¶>It is not the role of the courts to establish legislative policy or to second-guess policy choices the General Assembly makes. Kaminski v. Metal & Wire Prods. Co., 125 Ohio St.3d 250, 2010–Ohio–1027, 927 N.E.2d 1066, ¶ 61. If the General Assembly intended to preclude payday-style lending of any type except according to the requirements of the STLA, our determination that the legislation enacted in 2008 did not accomplish that intent will permit the General Assembly to make necessary amendments to accomplish that goal now. But the position that amici in support of appellee urge upon this court is fraught with legislative policy decisions, and to adopt that position would exceed the bounds of this court’s authority.